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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
 
Nature of the Case 
 
 Antonio Sandoval challenges the district court’s order awarding restitution to the Canyon 
County Sheriff’s Office for the costs of extraditing him from Nevada.  The court abused its 
discretion by awarding restitution because the loss was not a result of Mr. Sandoval’s criminal 
conduct and Idaho law provides that extradition costs should be paid by either the state treasury 
or the county to which to defendant was extradited.  This Court should therefore vacate the 
restitution order. 
   
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings 
In December 2014, Mr. Sandoval pled guilty to delivery of marijuana.  (R., pp.53–56.)  
Consistent with the parties’ binding plea agreement, the court sentenced him to three and one-
half years, with one year fixed.  (R., pp.53–56, 62–64.)  The court also ordered Mr. Sandoval to 
pay $585 in restitution, pursuant to I.C. § 19–5304, to Canyon County Sheriff’s Office (the 
“Sheriff’s Office”) for the cost of extraditing him from Nevada.  (R., pp.65–66; 2/24/15 Tr., p.7, 
Ls.5–17.)  Mr. Sandoval filed a notice of appeal timely from the restitution order.  (R., pp.76–
78.)   
Mr. Sandoval objected to the restitution award.  (R., pp.71–72.)  He did not contest the 
amount the Sheriff’s Office paid to extradite him, but rather argued that he was not responsible 
for paying that cost.  (4/7/15 Tr., p.14, Ls.15–21.)  First, Mr. Sandoval argued that the costs of 
extradition were not properly awarded under either I.C. § 37–2732(k) or I.C. § 19–5304 because 
Mr. Sandoval’s extradition was not a cost incurred because of his criminal conduct.   (4/7/15 
Tr., p.15, L.18 – p.16, L.14, p.22, Ls.15–23.)  Mr. Sandoval did not leave Idaho in an attempt to 
evade his arrest, but was just going about his life unaware that a grand jury had indicted him.   
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(4/7/15 Tr., p.16, L.12 – p.17, L.14, p.19, L.24 – p.20, L.6, p.22, L.23 – p.23, L.1)  Second, the 
extradition costs were not properly awarded as restitution because I.C. § 19–4528 specifically 
outlines who should pay for extraditions—either the state or the county.1  (4/7/15 Tr., p.17, L.15 
– p.19, L.7.)  In response, the State argued that the restitution was proper as an investigative or 
prosecution expense under I.C. § 37–2732(k).  (4/7/15 Tr., p.19, L.9 – p.21, L.23; R., pp.73–74.)   
The court denied the objection:  “As it is a matter of discretion, this Court has reviewed 
it, does feel that the costs requested by the State are appropriate, that the restitution order 
previously entered by the Court for the cost of extradition in the amount of $585 pursuant to 
Idaho Code 37–2732(k) are appropriate.”  (4/7/15 Tr., p.23, L.24 – p.24, L.4; see also Aug., p.1.) 
 
                                            
1 Defense counsel also stated that I.C. § 19–4528 gives the county commissioners “the discretion 
to seek reimbursement against the accounts of the defendant if they so choose.”  (4/7/15 
Tr., p.22, Ls.1–5.)  Although appellate counsel disagrees with this reading of the statute, see 
I.C. § 19–4528 (“the expenses on the account of the said defendant may be allowed and paid at 
the discretion of the board of county commissioners”), defense counsel’s assertion does not 
matter for the purposes of this appeal because the county commissioners have not sought 
reimbursement from Mr. Sandoval.   
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ISSUE 
Did the district court err by awarding restitution to the Sheriff’s Office for the costs of 
extraditing Mr. Sandoval to Idaho?  
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ARGUMENT 
The District Court Erred By Awarding Restitution To The Sheriff’s Office For The Costs Of 
Extraditing Mr. Sandoval To Idaho 
 
This Court reviews a district court’s decision to award restitution for an abuse of 
discretion.  State v. Lombard, 149 Idaho 819, 822 (Ct. App. 2010).   
In reviewing the trial court’s exercise of discretion, this Court must 
determine whether the trial court: (1) correctly perceived the issue as one 
involving the exercise of discretion; (2) acted within the outer boundaries of its 
discretion and consistently with any legal standards applicable to specific choices 
it had; and (3) reached its decision by an exercise of reason.   
 
State v. Olpin, 140 Idaho 377, 378 (Ct. App. 2004).    
The district court abused its discretion by awarding restitution for the extradition costs.2  
First, under I.C. § 19–5304, Mr. Sandoval’s extradition was not an expense “resulting from [his] 
criminal conduct” because he was just going about his life when he left Idaho, and he did not 
know a grand jury had indicted him.  Second, although I.C. § 37–2732(k) generally allows 
“restitution for costs incurred by law enforcement agencies in investigating the violation,” 
I.C. § 19–4528 specifically provides that either the state treasury or the county to which to 
defendant was extradited should reimburse law enforcement for extradition costs.  Therefore, this 
Court should vacate the order awarding $585 in restitution to the Sheriff’s Office.   
                                            
2 The court initially awarded restitution under I.C. § 19–5304 (R., p.66), but relied on I.C. § 37–
2732(k) when denying Mr. Sandoval’s objection to that award (Aug., p.1).  Mr. Sandoval 
therefore addresses both provisions.  
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A.   Mr. Sandoval’s Extradition Was Not A Result Of His Criminal Conduct, So The Court 
Could Not Award Restitution Under I.C. § 19–5304  
 
Idaho Code § 19–5304(2) provides that, “[u]nless the court determines that an order of 
restitution would be inappropriate or undesirable, it shall order a defendant found guilty of any 
crime which results in an economic loss to the victim to make restitution to the victim.”  
“‘Economic loss’ includes, but is not limited to, the value of property taken, destroyed, broken, 
or otherwise harmed, lost wages, and direct out-of-pocket losses or expenses, such as medical 
expenses resulting from the criminal conduct . . . .”  I.C. § 19–5304(1)(a) (emphasis added).   
The State has the burden to “prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, a causal 
relationship between the defendant’s criminal conduct and the damages suffered by the victim.”  
State v. Reale, 158 Idaho 20, 25 (Ct. App. 2014).   
“[C]ausation consists of actual cause and true proximate cause. Actual cause is 
the factual question of whether a particular event produced a particular 
consequence.  The ‘but for’ test is used in circumstances where there is only one 
actual cause or where two or more possible causes were not acting concurrently.  
On the other hand, true proximate cause deals with whether it was reasonably 
foreseeable that such harm would flow from the negligent conduct.  In analyzing 
proximate cause, this Court must determine whether the injury and manner of 
occurrence are so highly unusual that a reasonable person, making an inventory of 
the possibilities of harm which his conduct might produce, would not have 
reasonably expected the injury to occur.” 
 
State v. Davis, 156 Idaho 671, 673 (Ct. App. 2014) (quoting State v. Corbus, 150 Idaho 599, 602 
(2011) (alteration in original).   
 Here, it is undisputed that Mr. Sandoval left Idaho before he knew the grand jury had 
returned an indictment against him and thus his leaving had nothing to do with this case or an 
attempt to evade arrest.  (4/7/15 Tr., p.16, L.12 – p.17, L.14, p.19, L.24 – p.20, L.6, p.22, L.23 – 
p.23, L.1)  Further, it was law enforcement’s decision to wait over a year before indicting 
Mr. Sandoval.  (4/7/15 Tr., p.16, Ls.17–23) (defense counsel explaining that this crime occurred 
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on September 17, 2013, but Mr. Sandoval was not indicted until October 2, 2014).)  Therefore, 
Mr. Sandoval could not have reasonably expected that his criminal conduct would cause that 
injury to the Sheriff’s Office, nor was his extradition a result of his criminal conduct.  The 
district court abused its discretion by awarding restitution for the cost of extradition under 
I.C. § 19–5304. 
  
B. Because I.C. § 37–2732(K) Does Not Mention Extradition Costs, While I.C. § 19–4528 
Specifically Provides That Extradition Costs Will Be Paid By The State Or The County, 
I.C. § 19–4528 Controls 
 
The rule that statutes in pari materia are to be construed together means 
that each legislative act is to be interpreted with other acts relating to the same 
matter or subject.  Statutes are in pari materia when they relate to the same 
subject.  Such statutes are taken together and construed as one system, and the 
object is to carry into effect the intention. 
 
State v. Creech, 105 Idaho 362, 367 (1983) (quoting Meyers v. City of Idaho Falls, 52 Idaho 81, 
89–90 (1932)) (rev’d in part on other grounds in Creech v. Arave, 947 F.2d 873 (9th Cir. 
1991))); see also State v. Neal, 362 P.3d 514, 520 (2015) (“[A]ll sections of applicable statutes 
must be construed together so as to determine the legislature’s intent.  Statutes and ordinances 
should be construed so that effect is given to their provisions, and no part is rendered superfluous 
or insignificant.”) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). 
The parties below argued that two different statutes dictated who should pay for the cost 
of extraditing Mr. Sandoval in this case—I.C. § 37–2732(k) and I.C. § 19–4528.  First, when a 
defendant is convicted of a crime under the Uniform Controlled Substances Act, the court may 
order the defendant to pay restitution  
for costs incurred by law enforcement agencies in investigating the violation. . . .  
Costs shall include, but not be limited to, those incurred for the purchase of 
evidence, travel and per diem for law enforcement officers and witnesses 
throughout the course of the investigation, hearings and trials, and any other 
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investigative or prosecution expenses actually incurred, including regular salaries 
of employees. . . .   
 
I.C. § 37–2732(k).  The Court of Appeals has interpreted this statute broadly to include costs 
incurred when officers attended restitution hearings, see State v. Mosqueda, 150 Idaho 830, 834 
(Ct. App. 2010), and the cost of the prosecutor’s salary when attending pretrial hearings, trial, 
and sentencing, see State v. Cardoza, 155 Idaho 889, 894 (Ct. App. 2014).   
Second, Idaho has adopted the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act, which outlines who 
should pay for extradition costs: 
When the governor of this state . . . demands from the executive authority 
of any state or territory of the United States, or of any foreign government, the 
surrender to the authorities of this state of a fugitive from justice, who has been 
found and arrested in such state, territory, or foreign government, the accounts of 
the person employed by him to bring back such fugitive must be audited by the 
board of examiners and paid out of the state treasury, provided that in any case 
where a person against whom criminal proceedings are pending in any court of 
this state is to be brought into this state for such proceedings, whether with or 
without any demand or proceedings by the governor of this state and there is no 
appropriation of state funds available for the purpose at the time, reasonable 
compensation for the services of any person employed to bring the defendant in 
such criminal proceedings to this state and his expenses and the expenses on the 
account of the said defendant may be allowed and paid at the discretion of the 
board of county commissioners of the county where such criminal proceedings 
are pending from the general fund of said county, but no compensation for 
services as distinguished from expenses other than the regular salary shall be 
allowed any sheriff or deputy sheriff from either state or county funds. 
 
I.C. § 19–4528.   
Construing those statutes together, it is clear that I.C. § 19–4528 controls.  I.C. § 37–
2732(k) does not mention extradition costs, while I.C. § 19–4528 specifically provides that either 
the state or county will pay for costs incurred by law enforcement to extradite a defendant back 
to Idaho.  Importantly, I.C. § 19–4528 places a mandatory duty on the state:  “the accounts of the 
person employed by [the governor] to bring back such fugitive must be audited by the board of 
examiners and paid out of the state treasury, [unless] there is no appropriation of state funds 
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available for the purpose at the time.”  Id.  If there are no state funds available, then extradition 
costs “may be allowed and paid” by the county to which the defendant was extradited.  Id.   
Here, rather than the state or county reimbursing the Sheriff’s Office for extradition costs, 
the Sherriff’s Office has sought reimbursement from Mr. Sandoval.  That restitution is not 
specifically authorized by I.C. § 37–2732(k), while I.C. § 19–4528 expressly and unequivocally 
provides that costs of extradition will be paid by the state or the county.  The court abused its 
discretion by awarding $585 in restitution to the Sheriff’s Office under I.C. § 37–2732(k). 
    
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Sandoval respectfully requests that this Court vacate the district court’s restitution 
order.    
  DATED this 28th day of January, 2016. 
 
      ___________/s/______________ 
      MAYA P. WALDRON 
      Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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